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The US and NATO sit precariously perched on the precipice of failure in Afghanistan.
As suggested by Lieutenant-General David Richards, former commander of NATO
forces in Afghanistan, “We need to realize we could actually fail here.” Such a failure
could irreparably damage NATO’s credibility and create a regional crisis throughout
central and south Asia. In this article, Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English
suggest that the lessons drawn from British experience in Northern Ireland might be
constructively applied to the situation in Afghanistan — offering a way for NATO to
edge back from the brink of failure and regional catastrophe.
Les États-Unis et l’OTAN se retrouvent aujourd’hui en équilibre instable tout juste au
bord du gouffre afghan. « Nous devons envisager la possibilité d’un échec », prévient
à juste titre l’ancien commandant des forces de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, le lieutenant-
général David Richards. Un échec qui ferait un tort irréparable à la crédibilité de
l’OTAN et provoquerait une crise dans toute l’Asie centrale et du Sud. Thomas H.
Johnson et Richard English proposent ici d’appliquer à la situation afghane les leçons
de l’expérience britannique en Irlande du Nord. Et d’offrir ainsi à l’OTAN un moyen
d’éviter tout autant cet échec qu’une catastrophe régionale.
O ften maligned, Canada’s commitment inAfghanistan as part of the NATO/ISAF alliance is aserious one, in one of the most dangerous parts of
the country. Now Canadian forces in Kandahar find them-
selves beset both in the field and at home. Political discus-
sions in Ottawa and tribal machinations in Kandahar have
created a situation in which the force finds itself hobbled by
constraints dictated by Canadian domestic politics, unaided
by other NATO/ISAF allies either facing their own difficul-
ties or unwilling to help the Canadians, and under incessant
attack by a resurgent Taliban and their allies. According to
the Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, Canadian soldiers, as of late
2007, were dying at a rate thrice that of their British coun-
terparts and four times that of their American colleagues.
Recent debates in Canada have pledged a presence in
Afghanistan through 2011, and the US “mini-surge” of
Marines in the south promises to ease some of Canada’s
woes, but the force in Kandahar still has a tough row to hoe,
as do forces in otherparts of the country.
On April 27, 2008, during ceremonies near the
Presidential Palace in Kabul commemorating the 16th
anniversary of the fall of the Afghan communist government
an assassination attempt was made against President Karzai.
While Karzai survived the attack, during the subsequent 30-
minute fire fight three Afghan political officials were shot
dead and 11 people wounded. The Taliban claimed responsi-
bility for the attack, which it attributed to a dedicated six-
man cell, three of whose members were killed during the
attack. This event highlights the insurgents’ growing capabil-
ity to attack the Afghan regime and its supporters anywhere
and at any time, as well as possible fissures in (or at least
incompetence of) Karzai’s security detail. 
T hese disturbing events are compounded by the fact thatthe ongoing political and military crisis in Afghanistan
has been partially eclipsed by contemporary problems in Iraq.
But it is arguably Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, that is the
more significant theatre for the War on Terror. The depth and
urgency of the Afghan crisis are evident from the escalation
of insurgent violence, with 2007 being the most deadly year
since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom. Last year
witnessed a significant increase in Taliban and insurgent
operations, making for a destabilization “surge.” 
Things are obviously not well in Afghanistan and it
seems unlikely that things will improve dramatically in 2008.
The insurgency has moved significantly beyond the south
and east of the country and is now even closing in on Kabul
as suggested by the events of April 27. The Senlis Council has
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recently written that “the Taliban has
shown itself to be a truly resurgent
force” with an “ability to establish a
presence throughout the country.” 
T he current approach of the US andits NATO allies, including Canada,
in Afghanistan is simply not working,
and our strategy in this vital setting for
the struggle against terrorism urgently
requires rethinking. This article is
based on the assumption that such a
rethinking requires both a deep con-
textual knowledge of the Afghan polit-
ical and security situation, as well as an
ability to learn from the lessons of
post-conflict and violence-plagued
zones elsewhere. We draw on lessons
learned from recent Irish experiences
of terrorism and counter-terrorism and
consider these in relation to how best
we might proceed in the current and
future situation within Afghanistan. 
There are, of course, some signifi-
cant differences between the two set-
tings considered here. The timeline is
different, with the Northern Ireland
conflict erupting in the late 1960s and
the immediate Afghan crisis emerging
as a 21st-century phenomenon; the his-
torical contexts of the Afghan state and
the Northern Ireland state are different;
the religious cultures involved in the
combatant groups diverge in some key
respects; and the respective scales of dis-
order, crisis and military engagement
have been different in the two places.
Equally, however, there are striking
echoes and similarities between the
Northern Irish and Afghan cases and
between, for example, the violent
resistance characterizing the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and the
Taliban. In each case, we find the
extraordinary power of religiously
infused ethnic identity; in both set-
tings we find the profound intersection
of rival nationalisms with violence, as
well as considerable tension between
nation and state; in each setting there
has been the deployment of a mixture
of terrorist and insurgent violence for
political ends; and there have also been
some more mechanical or organiza-
tional similarities between the two
cases (involving the dynamics of rele-
vant international support for vio-
lence; porous borders; safe havens; the
local autonomy of violent operatives;
and the business of intra-communal
control on the part of violent agents).
T here exist sufficient similaritiesbetween the Irish and Afghan cases
for consideration of the former to illu-
minate our reading of the latter. In both
settings we have witnessed the pro-
found and durable strength of ethno-
religious identity. The Provisional IRA
emerged and fought as an explicitly
nationalist movement, pursuing the
goal of national self-determination and
attempting to further the communal
interests of the Irish people as such. But
it did so with backing from a very partic-
ular ethnic community within
Northern Ireland — the nationalist
community there — and this communi-
ty was overwhelmingly drawn from one
side of a starkly drawn religious divide
between Catholics and Protestants. In
terms of membership, the IRA was
almost exclusively Catholic; Irish
nationalism had, since the early 19th
century, effectively been a Catholic phe-
nomenon. The conflict during the 19th
and 20th centuries, between Irish
nationalism and its unionist/British
opponents in Ireland, was a battle
between two rival national or ethnic
groups. But these two national tradi-
tions were profoundly influenced by
religious identifications, organizations,
cultures and grievances. The national-
ism of Irish nationalists was heavily
Catholic in identity and composition,
while the British state and its unionist
adherents and their own associated
national identities were in turn deeply
influenced by Protestantism.
Parallel to the conflict in Ireland is
that of Afghanistan; proto-nationalist
Taliban and other insurgent groups are
seeking to overthrow the
democratically elected
Afghan government in
favour of a state run almost
exclusively by leaders of the
Ghilzai tribe of the Pashtun
ethnicity, along a very spe-
cific (and bastardized) code
of Deobandi Islam. Fiercely
xenophobic and long the rivals of
other ethnicities in Afghanistan, the
Taliban have also sought to construe
their opponents as un-Islamic for their
belief in other sects or schools of
Islamic law.
C learly, both the IRA and the Talibanalso exemplified the way in which
ethno-religious nationalism could inter-
sect with violent struggle, and both
groups pointed also toward the political
importance of historic tensions between
nation and state, and the significance of
fierce opposition toward foreign rule. In
Ireland, the IRA felt that the six-county
state in the northeast was wrongly incor-
porated into a hostile state (the United
Kingdom) and that violence was legiti-
mate as the only effective means of liber-
ating that territory from British control.
The IRA sought the establishment of an
independent and united Ireland: a state
comprising the whole of the Irish island
and one that was fully independent of
British power. Similarly, the Taliban seek
to establish an Islamic Emirate in
Afghanistan, of the type they almost had
from 1996 to 2001. To their minds, all
that prevents them is the presence of for-
eign troops, even if the majority of
Afghans have no desire to return to
Taliban rule either.
Both the IRA and the Taliban have
practised violence that has straddled the
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The Taliban, reliant on external funding, have managed to
maintain strong financial ties outside Afghanistan’s borders,
and gun-running has been closely linked to financial support
in the Afghan as in the Irish case. Again the Taliban have
enjoyed the benefits of secure and reliable areas of




division between terrorism and insur-
gent or guerrilla warfare. This is a vital
point. If terrorism is defined as the US
State Department has defined it
(“Premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub national
groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience”),
then it is clear that both the IRA and the
Taliban have indeed practised terrorism,
but also that not all of their violence has
been terrorist in nature. The IRA did kill
hundreds of civilians, many of them
murdered in unambiguously terrorist
fashion. But it also more frequently
killed military or security person-
nel, and the history of the IRA
has in practice involved some-
thing between terrorism and
irregular or guerrilla warfare.
T he Taliban tread the linebetween terrorism and
insurgency as well.
Undoubtedly they would like
to be insurgents, but without
true popular support they are
relegated to terrorist and crimi-
nal acts in order to perpetuate
their organization. This can
most easily be seen in the surge
in the use of improvised explo-
sive devices (IEDs) and in sui-
cide attacks, as well as their
increasing reliance on narcotics
as a source of revenue.
Additionally, the Taliban have
been attacking in much larger
units than they were previously and
over-running district centres with
alarming frequency.
In both the Irish and Afghan cases,
therefore, we have seen a deployment
of violence for political ends, in ways
that include (but that are not neatly
contained by the term) terrorism. And,
despite an understandable tendency for
Western governments to highlight the
terrorist complexion of their enemies’
campaigns, this combination of differ-
ent forms of violence is very common-
ly what we actually face when dealing
with terrorism across much of the
world. An effective response to this
challenge requires honest recognition
of such a reality.
There are also numerous mechani-
cal or organizational similarities between
our two case studies. Both the IRA and
the Taliban have benefited very signifi-
cantly from international support. In the
IRA’s case, this involved both the back-
ing of some US sympathizers and the
help offered by sympathetic regimes
(most significantly, that of Libya’s
Colonel Gaddafi). Such international
support networks provided money,
weaponry and other forms of important
backing for the IRA’s lengthy campaign.
The IRA also made good use of the
porous border between Northern Ireland
and the Irish Republic, storing weapons
in the latter (beyond the jurisdiction of
the UK state), and often launching
attacks from or establishing safe havens
in the Republic rather than in the more
deeply hostile atmosphere of the north.
O utside support and areas of safe-haven have also been vital for
the Taliban. In terms of comparison,
one could easily equate the financial
support of Irish-Americans for the IRA
to that given the Taliban by the Saudis
and Pakistan’s ISI. The Taliban, reliant
on external funding, have managed to
maintain strong financial ties outside
Afghanistan’s borders, and gun-run-
ning has been closely linked to finan-
cial support in the Afghan as in the
Irish case. Again the Taliban have
enjoyed the benefits of secure and reli-
able areas of geographic safe haven in
Pakistan. 
The Provisional IRA, particularly
from the mid-1970s onwards, gave great
organizational autonomy to local opera-
tives. Initially organized along tradition-
al military lines (into brigades, battalions
and so forth), the IRA then moved dur-
ing the 1970s toward a more flexible cel-
lular structure, with the result that
considerable initiative and
autonomy were enjoyed by local
units. This reflected and rein-
forced the varied pattern of IRA
activity (with some areas, such as
south Armagh, becoming partic-
ularly dynamic and active), and
it is a pattern echoed in
Afghanistan too. During the
period of Taliban control in
Afghanistan, the Kandahar
Shura controlled by Mullah
Omar was able to exert its will
throughout much of the area
controlled by the Taliban. In the
current insurgent environment,
however, it has proved much
more difficult for the Taliban to
maintain any effective central
control over the various com-
manders throughout the
provinces. Today’s Taliban are
being forced once again to
depend on operations originated and
executed at the local level, with the
shuras attempting to at least exude the
appearance of control. This has led to a
number of localized political and tribal
accommodations and complexities.
W ithin Northern Ireland, muchIRA energy and activity has
been devoted to intra-communal efforts
at control, a phenomenon that has
existed long into the peace process peri-
od of the 1990s and beyond.
Punishment beatings, shootings, intim-
idation and murder have all been used
in order to establish, maintain and
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In both the Irish and Afghan cases,
therefore, we have seen a
deployment of violence for political
ends, in ways that include (but that
are not neatly contained by the
term) terrorism. And, despite an
understandable tendency for
Western governments to highlight
the terrorist complexion of their
enemies’ campaigns, this
combination of different forms of
violence is very commonly what we
actually face when dealing with
terrorism across much of the world.
An effective response to this
challenge requires honest




enforce control in areas populated by
republican constituencies. This intra-
communal dimension of the IRA’s long
war was often eclipsed by its conflict
with the British state and with the
unionists of Northern Ireland. But
intracommunal punishment attacks
occupied much of the Provisionals’
energy, as those Catholics in the north
who were deemed to be engaged in
antisocial action (such as repeated
house robberies, car thefts or joy-riding)
were brutally policed with, for example,
beatings or kneecappings (the shooting
of victims through their knees). These
were extremely numerous, Irish repub-
licans carrying out 1,228 punishment
shootings between 1973 and 1997, and
a further 755 beatings from 1982-97.
Clearly, there was a problem in some
republican areas with petty (and with
not so petty) crime; and it also seems
clear that in some cases people’s real
crime was to have defied the writ of the
IRA. Intracommunal vendettas and
power struggles played their part in
these gruesome IRA policing methods.
In Afghanistan, a significant part of
the Taliban’s appeal and strength has
been its willingness and ability to
impose law and order amid chaos. Prior
to their ouster in 2001, many crimes in
areas they controlled were punished
summarily and brutally. It may not have
always been the guilty party punished
for the crime, but someone was always
punished. Despite economic reliance on
opium production, the Taliban did wage
a short yet successful campaign, against
the cultivation of poppy throughout
much of the country. Today the Taliban
are forced to deal with a number of rival
internal and external factions oft-times
with competing interests: Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami (HiG), the
Tora Bora Front, the Haqqani network,
various warlords and other groups
linked to the former Northern Alliance.
While the Taliban may show a willing-
ness to cooperate with some of these
groups due to a shared animosity
toward the Karzai government and
international forces, they harbour no
long-term power-sharing plans with
these factions. The result is occasional
violent clashes between these groups
and a willingness to betray their tempo-
rary partners to the coalition or the
Karzai government. Indeed, groups such
as HiG are consistently formulating
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plans to supplant the Taliban in case the
Karzai government falls.
Just as those deemed to be cooper-
ating with the IRA’s enemies in Ireland
were frequently targeted and punished
as a result, so too the Taliban wages a
constant campaign against those who
may sympathize or work with the
Karzai government, international
forces, or even international aid organ-
izations. Ignoring the Taliban’s threats
has often resulted in bombings, assas-
sinations, public executions, and
increasing levels of threats.
W hat lessons can we draw fromreflection on these significant
Afghan-Irish comparisons? Are there
broader implications for how to deal
with the crisis in Afghanistan, and
indeed with the problems posed by
terrorist and insurgent violence in
other settings? Five points are especial-
ly important.
First, in both the Northern Irish
1970s and the post-9/11 era of the War
on Terror, we can clearly see the counter-
productive dangers of over-militarizing
our response to terrorism. In this sense,
the War on Terror model has
arguably been an obstacle
rather than an advantage in
recent years. Superior mili-
tary force, well-suited to the
winning of formal military
conflict, has proved repeat-
edly counter-productive in




Ireland the British Army did
eventually help to contain the worst
excesses of inter-communal disorder,
but at a high price in terms of the anti-
state disaffection that they had gener-
ated in the process. One-sided curfew
and internment policies in 1970-71 —
combined with heavy-handed treat-
ment of internees and of suspect com-
munities beyond the jails — helped to
stimulate precisely the kind of anti-
state terrorist violence that such meas-
ures had been intended to uproot.
Friction between the British Army and
the Catholic working class in Belfast
and Derry during 1970-72 pushed peo-
ple toward rather than away from the
Provisional IRA and made the IRA a far
more significant force than they other-
wise would have been. 
In Afghanistan there is a similar
dynamic in effect. As one Pakistani
diplomat told the International Crisis
Group, “When a child is killed in one of
these villages, that village is lost for 100
years. These places run on revenge.”
Given the current methods of dislodg-
ing hostile elements via long-range
weaponry, civilian casualties have
plagued US and NATO efforts since the
beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom in 2001. The Taliban and
other groups have used this to their
advantage by sheltering themselves
within civilian areas, using the popula-
tion as a shield. Some villages have
resisted these Taliban incursions, but
many are unable to do so, so that when
artillery and aerial bombardment strike
the village, it bears a US stamp.
The metric the US has used in
Afghanistan for “collateral damage”
has been disastrous. As noted on CBS’s
60 Minutes in October 2007, up to 30
civilians may be killed in order to kill
or capture a high-value target. This is
absolutely unacceptable and extremely
detrimental to the stated mission of
the US government in Afghanistan.
There is a very counter-productive
set of effects that can be produced
when states drift across the Weberian
line of legitimacy that divides them
from their terrorist opponents. The
abuse of human rights in settings such
as Northern Irish internment in the
1970s, or in Guantanamo Bay or Abu
Ghraib more recently, might be con-
sidered slight when set against the
atrocities of either the Provisional IRA,
al-Qaeida or the Taliban. But this miss-
es the central issue: namely, that our
primary objection to such human
rights abuses should be that they
demean both state and victim, and
that they simultaneously widen the
pool of disaffected opponents willing
to join precisely those terrorist groups
we want to stifle. 
In Northern Ireland the embryon-
ic IRA told people that the British state
was a brutal colonial power, hostile to
the Catholic community. The one-
sided Falls Curfew of 1970 in Belfast,
the internment of many innocent
Catholics from August 1971 onwards,
and the fatal shooting by the Parachute
Regiment of fourteen Catholic civilians
on Bloody Sunday in January 1972, all
seemed to make the IRA’s case more
plausible. IRA recruits swelled as a
result, and the lessons for our own
times are clear enough.
In a counterinsurgency, it is impor-
tant that civilian casualties be kept to
an absolute minimum. When they do
occur, it is important that the military
force involved take responsibility for its
actions, and if necessary make restitu-
tion or punish the guilty parties.
While the military response to
insurgency is far from ideal, coupled
with good intelligence it can produce
very successful counter-terrorist
efforts. By the latter days of the
Northern Ireland conflict, the state
had developed an extensive range of
agents and informers within paramili-
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First, in both the Northern Irish 1970s and the post-9/11 era
of the War on Terror, we can clearly see the counter-
productive dangers of over-militarizing our response to
terrorism. In this sense, the War on Terror model has arguably
been an obstacle rather than an advantage in recent years.
Superior military force, well-suited to the winning of formal
military conflict, has proved repeatedly counter-productive in
settings where the state faces embedded terrorist and
insurgent violence.
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tary groups such as the IRA and this
proved of greater value in countering
their terrorist campaign than had the
all-out deployment of the Parachute
Regiment. By the late stages of the
Northern Ireland Troubles, many (if
not most) IRA operations came to be
thwarted on the basis of prior state
information; while the IRA’s campaign
was not ended as a result, a ceiling was
put on its capacity.
A t the beginning of the Iraqi inva-sion in 2003, many US units with
language and cultural training were
shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. The
overall value of such experience and
training became quickly evident as
intelligence collection declined precip-
itously in Afghanistan. Evidently, the
US has ignored the value of experience
in the theatre of war, deploying divi-
sions to Afghanistan, then Iraq, then
back to Afghanistan. 
Second, in many of the settings in
which the War on Terror is being
fought, we face in fact a combination
of the terrorist and the communal-
insurgent, and we have to recognize
the frequently ethno-national basis for
the resistance that we encounter.
The implications of this under-
standing are huge if what we seek is
the basis for an end to conflict in set-
tings such as Afghanistan. Not all con-
flicts can be resolved, of course. Where
they can, however, it seems clear that
durable and pervasive state legitimacy
is the truly vital foundation for such
resolution. This was certainly the case
in Northern Ireland. The failure of the
IRA’s violence to achieve its ostensible
goals (British withdrawal or the
defence of Catholic communities)
established the basis for peace talks
and some form of compromise deal.
But the essence of that deal was the
creation of a Northern Ireland state
that could command the allegiance of
the majority of both warring commu-
nities. This necessitated significant
reform, and it involved recognition of
the rival ethno-national aspirations
and interests of the competing groups. 
T his leads to a third point: if we doacknowledge (and seek) the possi-
bility of a lasting settlement, then we
have to recognize both that this will
involve protracted negotiation and also
that it will result in disagreeable ex-
opponents being in power and pursu-
ing what might seem unappetizing
policies. In Northern Ireland’s recently
established power-sharing government,
a prominent ex-IRA man (Sinn Fein’s
Martin McGuinness) is the Deputy First
Minister. McGuinness is on record as
having been a proud member of the
IRA, an organization that killed more
people than did any other group in the
Northern Ireland conflict. Yet his inclu-
sion in government exemplifies two
key and encouraging realities: first, that
the method of campaign previously
espoused by such figures has been
judged by them not to be successful;
second, that such figures have the
capacity to bring with them into peace-
ful politics a constituency previously
hostile to the state and previously sup-
portive of anti-state violence. 
In Afghanistan, the Taliban has
fractured to a certain extent between
Pashtun nationalists (for lack of a better
term) and global “jihadists,” seeking a
greater Islamist state. The jihadist fac-
tion shows an increasing reliance on
foreign fighters, suicide tactics and
harsh terror as a means of enforcement.
The Pashtun nationalist wing, however,
has proved more willing to negotiate.
Many former pre-9/11 Taliban
have been incorporated into the pres-
ent government. It is entirely possible
that the neutralization of the Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan will require
the co-option of some of their leaders
by the national government.
Also related to the overlap between
terrorism and insurgency is a fourth
point: the vital question of state credibil-
ity in response to terrorism. Clearly, ter-
rorist violence — whether that of the
Provisional IRA or of al-Qaida
— lacks moral or political
legitimacy when considered
in terms of its supposed justi-
fications and efficacy. But
there are dangers also in
states drawing implausibly
stark, Manichaean contrasts
between their own violence
and that of terrorist oppo-
nents. In terms of the terrorists’ support
community, a depiction of the terrorist
group as merely criminal, gangsterish,
inherently evil, fanatical or insane will
make it more difficult for the state to win
the vital battle of hearts and minds with-
in that constituency.
T he Northern Irish experience istelling here. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s the UK authorities
attempted to present the IRA and other
terrorist groups in Northern Ireland as
ordinary criminals, and they sought to
deal with paramilitary prisoners just as
any other prisoners were treated. 
Prisoners refused to conform with
the prison system, friction escalated
between prison warders and inmates,
and by 1980 and 1981 they had
reached such a stand-off that republi-
can prisoners embarked on two hunger
strikes in pursuit of political status, the
latter strike involving ten prisoners
famously starving themselves to death.
It was quite understandable that
the UK authorities wanted to delegit-
imize the actions of groups such as the
IRA. And it is important to remember
that, while the funeral of an IRA
hunger striker like Bobby Sands gained
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In Afghanistan, the Taliban has fractured to a certain extent
between Pashtun nationalists (for lack of a better term) and
global “jihadists,” seeking a greater Islamist state. The jihadist
faction shows an increasing reliance on foreign fighters,
suicide tactics and harsh terror as a means of enforcement.





much attention, the funerals of the 472
people killed by the IRA during the
years of the 1976-81 prison protests
should demand at least as much atten-
tion when we reflect on this era.
Yet this prison war reflected the
problems of states when they present
terrorist opponents in ways that lack
credibility. Even those Irish nationalists
who did not support the IRA (and this
represented the majority of Irish
nationalists) knew that the IRA’s activi-
ties were primarily motivated by politi-
cal rather than merely criminal
ambition. When the government
forced people to decide between starv-
ing IRA prisoners’ claim to be political,
and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher’s denial of such status, very
many non-IRA nationalists lost sympa-
thy with the government, and UK cred-
ibility in the counter-terrorist
campaign was undermined. Moreover,
there were alternatives. The state pre-
sented a choice between seeing the IRA
as political (and therefore legitimate) or
criminal (and therefore illegitimate).
But a far more persuasive and credible
way of presenting matters would have
been to acknowledge the political
nature of a group such as the IRA, but
to point out that not all political cam-
paigns are legitimate. History abounds
with clearly political movements that
are rightly denied legitimacy for their
brutal actions (Hitler was unambigu-
ously political), and such an approach
would have allowed the government to
retain more sympathy among the IRA’s
potential support community.
I n fighting terror, states damagethemselves if their rhetoric, policies
and pronouncements lack credibility,
among one’s own backers as well as
among the potentially disaffected. The
presentation of widespread support for
violent movements must resonate
with what people will see on the
ground to be the case. 
The Taliban movement initially
came into being in an anarchic void;
they had popular support because the
southeast of the country existed with-
out law or order, and the Taliban’s jus-
tice, however harsh, was still justice.
One Afghan farmer tellingly remarked,
after the chaos of the early 1990s, that
at least with the Taliban, one could
leave their plow outside overnight,
and in the morning it would still be
there. This is precisely why the Taliban
are trying to destabilize the security
situation to the greatest extent possi-
ble, instead of focusing on strikes
against foreign forces. They want to
recreate the anarchic circumstances
that led them to power in the first
place. It was also this power vacuum
that encouraged so many capable men
to join the Taliban’s ranks; it was sim-
ply the only game in town. These men
may not be in complete agreement
with the Taliban leadership, but they
have goals that can be utilized by the
Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA?
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Afghan government, namely the hope
for a better Afghanistan. With the
exception of the hard-core extremists,
the Taliban can be co-opted. Karzai has
publicly stated that all but a few of the
Taliban are “reconcilable.” 
Fifth, we must recognize and uti-
lize the essential rationality of our
opponents and their support group.
The lesson of the Northern Irish peace
process is that it was (in the end) the
pragmatic rationality of the IRA that
allowed for establishing an end to the
conflict. The IRA had mistakenly
thought that their violence was neces-
sary and that it would produce victory.
When (by the late 1980s) they recog-
nized that violence would produce
lasting stalemate rather than victori-
ous success, they began to be open to
the possibility of alternative means of
achieving political momentum. States
are often wary of acknowledging that
their terrorist opponents act with the
same mixture of the rational and the
visceral that motivates most other peo-
ple in politics. But we should, in fact,
use this reality to our advantage. In
Ulster, when the IRA recognized that
elections would yield greater results
than car bombs, they eventually
swapped the latter for the former.
As previously stated, the Taliban is
an organization with methods that
serve articulated goals, even if there is
dissension among the ranks. To a cer-
tain extent, these goals are those of a
legitimate government: the safety, secu-
rity and independence of Afghanistan.
These aims, then, can be presented in
such a way as a function of the present
government of Afghanistan as to
induce some insurgents to pursue their
goals through other means. Just as the
Taliban have moved from an insurgent
force to a national government to an
insurgent force again, so perhaps can
some part of their force be persuaded to
present their ideas in a civilized, demo-
cratic manner.
Were the Taliban to participate
fully and openly in the democratic
process in Afghanistan, there is a signif-
icant chance they could eventually
push their politics to the dominant
position in the state. If this were to
happen, if they were slowly to be inte-
grated into the process, they might
eventually buy in to the system, having
some stake in it. This could result in
their attempting to protect the system
and prevent their more zealous compa-
triots from subverting the government.
T here are those who would arguethat no understanding can be
reached with the opponents in a coun-
terinsurgency, and that victory can
only be won when the last insurgent is
in his grave. Unfortunately, insurgen-
cies are not tangible things; they exist
in the minds of men, and their physical
manifestations are but extensions of
that thought process. In order to truly
pacify a troubled land such as Northern
Ireland or Afghanistan, opponents
must be co-opted whenever possible,
and force used only as a last resort. 
The British experience and time
served in pacifying Northern Ireland
holds a number of valuable lessons for
foreign forces in Afghanistan today.
Over decades the British sought
through a combination of carrots and
sticks to bring that fractured territory
to heel, and their lessons learned
deserve careful study for students of
counterinsurgency. The five points
mentioned above — avoiding an over-
militarized response whenever possi-
ble; understanding the ethno-national
nature of the conflict; seeking settle-
ments through political accommoda-
tion wherever possible; and recogniz-
ing and co-opting the rationality of
the insurgents’ platform — are all
notions that have carried the day in
the durable peace created in Northern
Ireland, and can work in Afghanistan.
Delaying the implementation of
the points presented here will prolong
the Afghan insurgency and keep NATO
troops, including Canada’s, in harm’s
way, and as the British
learned, every trooper on
the ground, every armoured
vehicle patrolling a neigh-
bourhood was a victory for
the insurgent propaganda.
In Afghanistan the circum-
stances are even more dire:
a successful insurgency in
Afghanistan affects not only the nation
itself, but its neighbours as well. And as
we have seen, failure there can easily
and quickly result in death and
destruction on our own shores. 
The parallels of the two conflicts
are true for many insurgencies.
Ethnic, political and religious grudges
are not so dissimilar from one another
that certain themes cannot be isolat-
ed. By doing so, we can not only bet-
ter understand the nature of the
insurgent and insurgency, but we can
seek to minimize that disagreement.
To paraphrase Mao, if an effective
insurgent must move among the peo-
ple as a fish in the sea, the trick then
is to get the fish out of water. In
Northern Ireland the British eventual-
ly produced conditions within which
popular support for IRA violence
could be eroded. In Afghanistan, we
must strive to do the same. Only then
will the insurgency wither.
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Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English
In fighting terror, states damage themselves if their rhetoric,
policies and pronouncements lack credibility, among one’s
own backers as well as among the potentially disaffected. The
presentation of widespread support for violent movements
must resonate with what people will see on the ground to be
the case. 

